This paper examines the impact of tax-based export promotion on exchange rates and patterns of trade. The threatened removal of Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs) due to the 1997 European Union complaint before the World Trade Organization (WTO) is used to identify the adjustment of exchange rates to reduced after-tax margins for American exporters. The evidence indicates that days associated with significant developments in the European complaint are characterized by predicted changes in the value of the U.S. dollar. Additionally, foreign trading relationships with the United States appear to influence currency responses to the possibility of FSC repeal. Exchange rate movements on the date of the initial European complaint indicate that 10 percent greater net trade deficits with the United States are associated with currency appreciations of 0.2 percent against the U.S. dollar. This evidence is consistent with a combination of trade-based exchange rate determination and important effects of U.S. export promotion policies.
1.

Introduction.
Many countries attempt to encourage exports by improving the after-tax margins earned by their exporters. The United States offers one such attractive menu of export incentives through its income tax. Of these incentives, the best known is the opportunity to exclude from U.S. tax roughly 15 percent of profits earned by exporting products from the United States. Controversies over export promotion policies rest on certain largely untested economic premises concerning the ability of tax and other policies effectively to stimulate greater exports.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of tax incentives for U.S. exports by examining exchange rate reactions to the announcement of the European complaint against the United States on November 18, 1997. Filing of the European complaint introduced the possibility that the existing 15 percent income exclusion would be eliminated or greatly reduced. To the extent that real exchange rates are determined by purchasing power parity, it follows that removal of export incentives that effectively stimulate American exports should be accompanied by a fall in the value of the U.S. dollar relative to foreign currencies. Furthermore, this exchange rate movement should vary between countries, since the currencies of countries that import from the United States will exhibit very different reactions than those of countries that are major exporters to the United States.
The results presented in this paper are quite consistent with a major effect of tax provisions on exchange rate movements and patterns of international trade. The U.S. dollar fell against benchmark currencies on November 18, 1997, and on other days in the ensuing three years when events suggested that the United States would be required to repeal its tax-based export incentives.
Further indication of a link between exchange rates and tax-based export incentives appears in the pattern of exchange rate reactions on November 18, 1997, when 10 percent greater net trade deficits with the United States were associated with currency appreciations of 0.2 percent against the U.S. dollar. This evidence is consistent with a combination of trade-based exchange rate determination and important effects of U.S. export promotion policies.
Section 2 of the paper describes U.S. efforts to encourage exports by exempting certain fractions of export profits from taxable income. Section 3 presents time series evidence of the effect of the European FSC complaint on the value of the U.S. dollar, identifying the extent to which dollar movements correspond to predicted effects of developments in the ongoing controversy. Section 4 offers a cross-sectional analysis of exchange rate movements on November 18, 1997, in which foreign currencies react in a way that is consistent with the trade implications of possible FSC repeal. Section 5 is the conclusion.
2.
Foreign Sales Corporations.
Firms exporting goods from the United States during the years 1971 -2000 were entitled to do so in legally roundabout fashions that enabled them to exempt a fraction of export profits from taxation. 1 While complying with the necessary rules was cumbersome, the tax advantages were large enough to make it well worth the while of most large American exporters to take advantage of this opportunity.
In order to obtain this export subsidy from 1984 to 2000, 2 it was necessary to establish an FSC in an offshore location such as Guam, Barbados, or the Virgin Islands. For legal purposes, exports might then travel from the United States to their ultimate foreign destinations via the FSC.
Hence, an American computer company selling a computer manufactured in Texas to a buyer in northern Italy first sold the computer to its FSC located in Guam, which in turn sells the computer to the buyer in Italy. The computer did not travel to Guam in the course of this sale, nor were the FSC offices located in Guam typically very active; instead, these were largely paper transactions.
In the course of these transactions, the FSC located in Guam earned a profit; some of this profit was immediately subject to U.S. taxation, but a fraction equal to 15/23 was forever exempt, thereby providing a tax subsidy for exporters.
3
For an American firm whose profits are fully taxed by the United States at the 35 percent corporate tax rate, there was a benefit associated with making the FSC's share of total export profits as large as possible. 4 Consider the case in which the American computer manufacturer produced its computer for $1,500 in the United States and sold the computer in Italy for $2,000.
Without the use of an FSC, all $500 of this profit was subject to U.S. taxation at the 35 percent 1 Portions of the following brief description of FSCs and summary of the relevant literature are excerpted from Desai and Hines (forthcoming). 2 The phrase "export subsidy" appearing here and elsewhere refers only to the economic concept of export subsidy (as used, for example, by Krugman and Obstfeld (1991, pp. 108-111) ), and not the legal concept of "export subsidy" as defined by WTO rules. A far more elaborate legal and textual analysis than that provided in this paper is necessary in order to determine whether or not U.S. export tax incentives represent "export subsidies" for WTO purposes. 3 Alternatively, the Guamanian FSC might not take title to the export property, but instead receive a commission for facilitating the export sale. According to data reported by Belmonte (2000) , 21% of FSCs in 1996 bought and sold export property, while the remaining 79% simply received commissions for export sales. 4 The tax benefits of exporting through FSCs were available to all corporations in the United States, including those that are foreign-owned. 6 Exporters of intangible property such as patent rights are typically compensated in the form of royalties that are treated as foreign-source income under U.S. law and therefore effectively untaxed if received by domestic taxpayers with excess foreign tax credits. See Hines (1995) for an analysis of the economic impact of this treatment of royalty income. Additionally, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 permitted computer software to receive FSC treatment starting in 1998. 7 Grubert et al. (1996) report that firms with excess foreign tax credits received 33 percent of the foreign income of American corporations in 1984, and 66 percent in 1990, which follows the U.S. tax rate reduction in 1986. They also note that the fraction of foreign income received by firms with excess foreign tax credits appears to be falling over time, reaching 35 percent in 1992.
2000, Desai and Hines (forthcoming) President Clinton who referred specifically to the WTO dispute at the signing of the legislation.
3.
Time series evidence of the impact of the WTO controversy.
U.S. tax policies encourage exports by improving the after-tax margins received by
American exporters. As a result, the introduction of an export subsidy typically makes exporters eager to expand their sales abroad, which in competitive markets results in reduced purchase prices for foreign buyers and greater export volume. 9 Long-run trade balance then implies that the prices of American goods must appreciate relative to the prices of foreign goods, since otherwise the United States would become a net exporter. This price adjustment can be accomplished either by greater inflation differentials between the United States and other countries, or, more likely, by an appreciation of the value of the American dollar relative to the values of foreign currencies. 10 One simple way to think about how this happens is to note that the export subsidy makes American 9 Portions of this section are drawn from Desai and Hines (forthcoming). The situation is somewhat more complex when firms export to their own foreign affiliates, since then the existence of export subsidies encourages exporters to charge higher export prices. This incentive conflicts with regulations that require firms to charge arm's-length prices for exports to related parties, so the net effect on final prices is unclear. See Rangan and Lawrence (1993) and Clausing (forthcoming). 10 While the assumption of purchasing power parity (PPP) is commonly made, the available evidence (reviewed by Froot and Rogoff (1995) ) suggests that PPP is best understood as a long-run phenomenon. Recent attention in international macroeconomics (see, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) ) has identified distortions to international goods more attractive to foreign buyers, which leads to dollar appreciation. The endogenous change in the value of the dollar in turn serves to attenuate the effect of the export subsidy on export volumes, since American goods become less attractive to foreign buyers as the dollar appreciates. The net effect of the subsidy and the endogenous change in the value of the dollar is to expand the volumes of both American exports and American imports. These expansions are of course nonuniform, and in particular, exports of goods that are ineligible for the tax subsidy will fall, even as exports of those that are eligible for the tax subsidy will rise. By looking at changes in the value of the American dollar on those dates, it is possible to infer the effect of the FSC program on proclivities to export from the United States. Since many other factors also influence exchange rates, it is necessary to interpret this information carefully.
The leftmost column of Table 1 All that was necessary was for a major complaintant to appear with charges against the United
States, and that happened on November 18, 1997.
11 Table 1 is drawn from Desai and Hines (forthcoming) . 12 The British pound is chosen as the alternative to the U.S. dollar for these calculations because it is a common benchmark currency, and one that was not buffeted either by events surrounding the European Monetary Union or the economic crises in Japan and Asia.
Given uncertainty over the ultimate impact of any WTO action, an exchange rate response of roughly 0.1 percent is quite in line with the effect of estimated supply and demand elasticities.
At an average profit margin of 10 percent, a 15 percent tax exclusion reduces taxable income by 1.5 percent of sales. At a tax rate of 35 percent, this generates a tax saving of 0.5 percent of saleswhich, given the 35 percent tax rate, produces approximately a 0.75 percent reduction in prices at which exporters would be willing to offer goods for foreign sale. Of course, elimination of the FSC program would not necessarily entail elimination of export subsidies through the sales source rules, so not all the value of FSCs is likely to be lost in the course of a successful dispute brought by the European Union.
Taking the aggregate price elasticity of U.S. exports to be roughly equal to -1.0, and the aggregate price elasticity of U.S. imports to be roughly equal to -0.5, 13 it follows that an offsetting exchange rate movement of two thirds the size of the lost export subsidy -or 0.5 percent -is required to restore trade balance. 14 Then allowing for the incomplete use of FSCs, and the backstop use of the sales source rules by firms currently electing FSC treatment of their exports, together reduces this predicted effect, as does uncertainty over the final disposition of the FSC program. So the likely impact of the European Union action is to reduce the value of the dollar by perhaps 0.1 percent, which appears to be what happened on November 18, 1997.
Subsequent events in the WTO controversy are also associated with changes in the value of the dollar, though these events are likely to be less important from the standpoint of their direct impact on dollar values. As reported in column one of Table 1 , the failure of initial consultations between the United States and the European Union on December 17, 1997 is associated with a fall 13 Sawyer and Sprinkle (1996) suggest these estimates on the basis of their survey of empirical studies of aggregate U.S. export and import elasticities. See also Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (1998) . 14 Starting from trade balance, loss of FSC benefits reduces exports by (0.75 + e) percent and reduces imports by (-0.5)e percent, in which e is the change in the dollar exchange rate. Trade balance then implies that e = -0.5. Since many events in the course of a day are likely to influence exchange rates, and the expected impact of the FSC program is subtle, it is a mistake to overinterpret the results reported in column one of While the results reported in Table 1 appear to be robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables that reflect the economic significance of daily events, it is inevitable that important factors are omitted. November 18, 1997 differs from most others in being a very slow news day, the main international trade-related nuggets being the (anticipated) failure of a large Japanese bank and the lifting of the European ban on imports of Iranian pistachios. Hence, the filing of a European complaint against the United States was a major development, and it is reasonable to infer that the exchange rate movement on that day reflects the impact of that news.
While the consistency of the sign pattern for other event days, as reported in 
A Model of Export Incentives and Exchange Rates.
15 Most previous studies of U.S. export tax incentives use estimated export and import elasticities to predict the impact of export promotion, rather than estimate actual impacts. Examples include reports by the U.S. Treasury (1993 Treasury ( , 1997 that estimate that FSC repeal would reduce U.S. exports by $1.5 billion in 1992; Horst and Pugel (1977) , who estimate that repeal of DISCs (a predecessor to FSCs ) would reduce U.S. exports by $2.1 billion in 1974; and Mutti and Grubert (1984) , who likewise find that DISC repeal would reduce U.S. exports by 3.1 percent in 1979. Rousslang and Tokarick (1994) estimate that the FSC and sales source rules together have the same effect on trade volume as would reducing American tariffs by more than one third. Kemsley (1998) differs from this literature in estimating the impact of tax policy changes on export proclivities; he finds that firms with excess foreign tax credits (and therefore that are able to benefit from the sales source rules) have higher ratios of exports to sales by foreign affiliates than do firms with deficit foreign tax credits. Desai and Hines (forthcoming) estimate that the 1984 repeal of DISCs and introduction of the less generous FSCs were responsible for a 3.1 percent decline in U.S. exports. Desai and Hines (2001) also report that the European complaint on November 18, 1997 is associated with a 0.5 percent drop in market value for the average American exporter.
In order to predict the cross-sectional impact of potential FSC repeal, it is helpful to consider country i's trade balance, its net exports being denoted i ψ and defined as the difference between aggregate exports and aggregate imports:
(1) is country i's demand for imports from country j, which is a function of p, the vector of real prices (in units of country i's currency) paid by country i importers. The vector p differs from e due to export subsidies; assuming that foreign markets are perfectly competitive, it follows that export subsidies are fully passed through to buyers in the form of lower prices, so the elements of p are ( )
, in which e k is the real value of country k's currency, and s k is the rate at which country k subsidizes exports. Trade balance implies that
Consider a small increase in the export subsidy provided by country one. This policy change affects country i's trade balance in four ways: first, by reducing i's cost of importing from country one; second, by strengthening the value of country one's currency and therefore attracting exports from country i; third, by influencing the value of country i's currency; and fourth, by
influencing the values of all other currencies. Taking the fourth effect to be small enough (from country i's standpoint) safely to ignore, it is convenient to define starting units so that all exchange rates are unity and initial export subsidies are zero. Imposing the trade balance condition, the first three effects are captured by differentiating equation (1) , with magnitudes that depend on aggregate supply and demand elasticities, as well as the extent to which the average value of country 1's currency is affected by its own export subsidies.
Data and Evidence.
In order to test the implications of this model of the influence of tax policies on real exchange rates, it is necessary to analyze the relationship between exchange rate reactions to the potential removal of U.S. export subsidies through FSCs and proclivities to trade with the United
States. For this purpose, the exchange rate reaction, 1 ds de i in equation (7), is taken to be the one-day σ , is the share of its imports purchased from the United States in 1997. The sample consists of 58 countries for which these data are available. Table 2 presents means and standard deviations of the variables for the entire sample, as well as for a subsample of countries for whom the United States is a "major trading partner" (meaning that their U.S. export shares exceed the median value for the entire sample).
The results of estimating (7) for the whole sample are reported in column 1 of Table 3 , in which the coefficients on both the import and export shares have the predicted signs. The coefficient of 1.36 on the import share implies that the currency of a country with one hundred percent of its imports coming from the United States appreciates relative to the U.S. dollar by 1.36 percent more on November 18, 1997 than would the currency of a country with no imports from the United States. While large relative to the mean for the entire sample, this predicted exchange rate movement is consistent with the time series evidence presented in Table 1 . Table 3 provides OLS standard errors as well as heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors; levels of statistical significance are notably higher with the OLS standard errors. In order to control directly for one potential source of heteroskedasticity, the regression reported in column 3 is run on the major trading partners subsample; the estimated coefficients are of similar magnitude and significance to those obtained with the full sample.
The specifications in columns 2 and 4 define the independent variable as the difference between import and export shares. This specification effectively constrains the 1 β and 2 β coefficients in (7) to be of equal magnitude and opposite sign. The coefficient on the difference in column 2 is positive, as predicted, and on the borderline of being statistically significant. The estimated coefficient of 1.85 implies that ten percent differences in net trade shares are associated with 0.185 percent differences in exchange rate reactions on the event day. Since the sample standard deviation of the trade share difference (as reported in Table 2 ) is 8.2 percent, it follows that a one standard deviation trade share difference is responsible for exchange rate reactions that differ by 0.15 percent. This is of similar magnitude to the 0.11 percent daily reaction estimated in the time series results reported in Table 1 and, in that sense, quite consistent with those results.
The specification reported in column two of Table 3 is used to estimate the model on the subsample of data for major trading partners, again generating a coefficient of similar magnitude to that obtained from estimating the model on the whole sample. This cross-country evidence of an important association between trading patterns and magnitudes of exchange rate movements on November 18, 1997 reinforces the time series evidence linking exchange rate movements and developments in the WTO controversy.
5.
Conclusion.
The practice of using tax incentives and other commercial policies to encourage exports relies on the premise that such policies are likely to be effective at stimulating exports. To date, this premise has had limited empirical foundation. This paper provides evidence on the effect of U.S. tax-based export promotion policies on patterns of international trade by examining the movement of exchange rates in response to developments surrounding the 1997 European complaint before the WTO. The time series evidence demonstrates that significant developments in the WTO dispute were associated with predicted changes in the value of the dollar versus a benchmark currency. Purchasing power parity implies that cross-country differences in trade relations with the United States should predict the magnitudes of relative currency movements. 
